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EXTERNAL STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF THE AVIATION 
MAINTENANCE, REPAIR AND OVERHAUL (MRO) INDUSTRY 
AND POTENTIAL MARKET OPPORTUNITIES FOR FLEET 




The purpose of this MBA professional report is to supplement the long and short 
range strategic development efforts of Fleet Readiness Center Southwest (FRCSW) by 
providing command leadership with an analysis of the current aviation maintenance, 
repair, and overhaul (MRO) industry to identify potential expansion opportunities for 
FRCSW. 
Strategy development is dependent upon a solid, current and complete industrial 
analysis.  An industrial analysis includes, 1) a definition of the industry, 2) a description 
of external forces acting upon the industry, 3) a description of the industry structure and 
4) an examination of the key success factors that benchmark the requirements for a firm 
to stay competitive in the industry.  These analyses provide FRCSW with the information 
required to leverage their core competencies to indentify and capitalize on potential 
opportunities in the industry. 
This study identifies emerging trends, presents projected forecasts, identifies 
external forces on both the military aviation MRO industry and FRCSW, and discusses 
those factors that are key to long term success in the military aviation MRO industry.  
The conclusions present a number of opportunities for FRCSW to explore in their effort 
to remain the Navy’s premier aviation depot. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this MBA professional report is to supplement the long- and short-
range strategic development efforts of Fleet Readiness Center Southwest (FRCSW) by 
providing command leadership with an analysis of the current aviation maintenance, 
repair and overhaul industry to identify potential expansion opportunities for FRCSW. 
An industry analysis provides FRCSW a useful tool in developing the new 
strategy required by the implementation of changes made by the passage of revisions to 
United States Code (U.S. Code) Title 10 in 2002; requiring the Department of Defense 
(DoD) to establish Centers of Industrial and Technological Excellence (CITEs) that will 
compete with private commercial firms for maintenance repair contracts.1  The 
competition opened up by the new Title 10 laws required all military depots to reassess 
how they were operating and begin to shift from the full-funding methods used 
throughout the Cold War to a business-style approach that took into account competition 
and strategy.  Development of this new brand of strategy began in earnest for FRCSW 
with its submission for the Malcom Baldrige National Quality Award in 2008.  The 
Malcom Baldrige award requires applicants to submit a response that details the process 
by which management develops internal strategy keyed toward long-term success in a 
competitive marketplace.  Application for the award requires that the contender develop, 
understand and successfully implement a competitive internal strategic process; the 
contender must describe in detail this process to the award committee.  While the 
Baldrige award helps to direct management in the realm of internal strategy, it does not 
provide adequate direction to develop a business’s external strategy.  This project 
provides the necessary information required for the business team at FRCSW to develop 
an appropriate external competitive strategy.  
                                                 
1 Title 10 and CITE issues will be discussed further in Chapter III. 
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B. ELEMENTS OF AN INDUSTRY ANALYSIS 
The development of an external strategy is dependent upon a solid, current and 
complete industrial analysis.  Development of an industrial analysis requires, 1) a 
definition of the industry, 2) a description of external forces acting upon the industry, 3) a 
description of the industry structure and 4) an examination of the key success factors that 
benchmark the requirements for a firm to stay competitive in the industry.   
1) Defining the industry is done by establishing boundaries within which the 
industry operates, namely the products and markets that describe the domain of the 
industry.  Once clearly defined, the domain of the industry provides a forum within which 
an analysis of the capabilities required to participate in the industry can be assembled.  
Definition of the products, markets and capabilities provide the parameters within which 
the industry can be effectively analyzed.   
2) Describing the external forces on the industry begins by defining the 
overarching industry structure through an examination of the five-forces of competition 
acting on the industry (Porter, 1980).  These five forces were defined by Michael Porter 
in the 1980s as the threat of new entrants, threat of existing rivals, threat of substitute 
products, bargaining power of the buyer, and bargaining power of the suppliers (Porter, 
1980).   
3) Once the five-forces are defined and analyzed for the individual industry, 
the structure of the industry can then be developed through an analysis of the macro-
factors acting on the industry.  The macro-factors are examined through use of a PEST 
analysis, wherein the external factors of political, economic, social, technological, 
environmental and legal pressures are examined.   
4) An examination of the industry structure provides a forum within which 
the factors that determine the success of a business in the industry can be analyzed.  
These key success factors are those things that directly impact the ability of a business to 




understanding what makes a firm viable in the long-term.  An industry analysis concludes 
with recommendations for possibilities that exploit the key success factors the firm 
already possesses.  
C. FLEET READINESS CENTER SOUTHWEST’S POSITION IN THE 
MAINTENANCE, REPAIR AND OVERHAUL INDUSTRY 
In 2007, $117 billion was spent in the Aviation Maintenance, Repair and 
Overhaul (AMRO) industry worldwide (Michaels, 2008).  The United States DoD was by 
far the largest single consumer of these services at $31 billion (Chrisman, 2008).  The 
United States DoD operates a fleet of 13,521 aircraft, making it far and away the largest 
fleet of aircraft in the world (Aviation Week & Space Technology, 2009).  Due to the size 
of the U.S. aircraft fleet, the DoD has internalized the majority of the maintenance and 
repair of their aircraft for all branches of the military.   
Each branch of the DoD conducts its own aircraft maintenance with the exception 
of the Marines, which use the Navy MRO facilities to conduct intermediate and depot 
level maintenance.  The Air Force utilizes three major facilities, designated as Air 
Logistics Centers (ALC), to conduct its depot level maintenance.  The Air Force divides 
work by designating an ALC as a Center of Industrial and Technical Excellence (CITE) 
for specific airframes and specific components.  For example, Ogden ALC is the CITE 
for A-10 Thunderbolt II, B-2 Spirit, F-16 Fighting Falcon, and components, such as 
landing gear systems and composite materials.   
The Army conducts all rotary wing aviation depot maintenance at Corpus Christi 
Army Depot, the Army’s CITE for rotary wing maintenance.  The Army contracts 
civilian aviation depots to conduct all depot level maintenance on its limited fixed wing 
assets. 
The Navy utilizes a series of three major depots (FRCSW North Island, FRCE 
Cherry Point and FRCSE Jacksonville), three minor depots (FRCW Lemoore, FRCNW 
Whidbey Island and FRCMA Oceana) and numerous smaller depots at stations across the  
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United States.  These Navy depots are referred to as Fleet Readiness Centers (FRCs) and 
are divided into geographic regions and commands, as shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.   FRC Command Structure (From: Kelly, 2008) 
The Navy utilizes a combination of single CITE and fleet-basing systems for 
determining which depot will conduct maintenance.  This means that the Navy maintains 
capabilities for depot-level repair of a single airframe at multiple locations in support of 
fleet basing.  This is supplemented by designation of CITE locations for components and 
airframes that provide the resident technical expertise to support depot level maintenance 
and provide this expertise to other FRCs as needed.  FRCSW is designated as the depot to 
conduct intermediate and depot level maintenance for all aircraft in the Southwest.  
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D. FLEET READINESS CENTER SOUTHWEST2 
The depot-level maintenance functions of FRCSW are nearly as old as Naval 
Aviation itself. In 1919, nine years after the start of Naval Aviation, the FRC began work 
as an Assembly and Repair Department of the Naval Air Station at North Island.  In 
1969, the Assembly and Repair Department was renamed the Naval Air Rework Facility 
(NARF).  By 1987, the NARF was renamed the Naval Aviation Depot (NADEP) North 
Island (Fleet Readiness Center Southwest, 2007).  As result of Base Closure and 
Realignment (BRAC) 2005, NADEP North Island was disestablished and realigned into 
FRCSW (Moore, 2008). 
Recognized as an innovator in depot-level maintenance by the Office of Naval 
Research’s Best Manufacturing Practices Program, FRCSW is the Navy’s primary west 
coast aircraft repair and modification facility for mission-essential fighter and rotary wing 
aircraft for Navy and Marine Corps squadrons (Moore, 2008). As of December 2007, 
FRCSW employed 4,371 people consisting of 3,494 civilian employees and 877 military 
personnel. The mission of the Fleet Readiness Center Southwest is: 
…CNAF’s [Commander Naval Air Forces] West Coast Aircraft Repair 
D2I [Depot to Intermediate] facility specializing in the support of Navy  
and Marine Corps aircraft and related systems. Through partnerships  
with industry, other government agencies and supporting aerospace 
organizations, FRC Southwest, North Island repairs and overhauls aviation 
systems (Fleet Readiness Center Southwest, 2007). 
FRCSW performs repair and modifications work on F/A 18 Hornets and Super 
Hornets, EA-6B Prowlers, E-2 Hawkeyes, C-2 Greyhounds, AV-8B Harriers, SH-60 
Seahawks and HH/MH-60s, AH-1 Cobras, UH/HH Hueys, and CH-53 Sea Stallions.  
Additionally, FRCSW deploys Field Service Teams and Voyager Repair Teams to 
deployed aviation squadrons, ships, and installations worldwide. The Field Service and 
Voyager Repair Teams provide depot-level maintenance repair and modification for 
aircraft, aviation structures, aircraft components, aircraft carrier catapult and arresting 
gear systems, and aviation equipment and facilities on other ships (Fleet Readiness  
                                                 
2 Section B with minor modifications is drawn directly from T. Curran and J. J. Schimpff, “An 
Analysis of Factors Generating the Variance between the Budgeted and Actual Operating Results of the 
Naval Aviation Depot at North Island, California,” (MBA Project, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008), 5-8. 
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Center Southwest, 2007).  In 2007, FRCSW deployed over 2,500 Field Service and 
Voyager Repair Teams, repaired and modified approximately 285 aircraft, and 
manufactured over 50,000 aircraft components (Fleet Readiness Center Southwest, 
2007). 
1. FRCSW Programs 
The FRCSW receives aircraft, engines and a multitude of components from 
activities within the U.S., as well as forward deployed units, for maintenance, 
modification and repair needed from normal operations or battle related damage. 
Requests to manufacture new replacement items for components that can no longer be 
repaired, refurbished or are not commercially available are also received from fleet units 
as well as other DoD components. These demands are satisfied by the services provided 
through one or more of the following seven FRCSW programs (Fleet Readiness Center 
Southwest, 2007). 
a. Components Program 
The components program at FRCSW has the capabilities to repair and 
refurbish over 19,000 different types of Navy, Marine Corps aircraft components, supply 
systems and DoD assets. The Components Department existed as a program within the 
Depot prior to the merger. As a result of the FRC implementation, the AIMD (Aircraft 
Intermediate Maintenance Department) repair capabilities and the Depot artisan (worker) 
skills are integrated into a single organization. The new organization has personnel, 
equipment and facilities specialized in the repair and refurbishment of Avionics, Aircraft 
Supports and Surfaces, Instruments and Generators, Landing Gear and Hydraulics 
components for units ashore and afloat. 
b.  E-2/C-2 Program 
The E-2/C-2 Program is comprised of five groups that include 1) PMI One 
and Two for repair and refurbishing (PMI-1/2), 2) PMI-3/Service Life Extension Program 
(SLEP)/Rewire (C-2), 3) In-Service Repair (ISR), 4) Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and 
5) E-2 Super Modules. 
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c. F/A-18 Program 
The F/A-18 Program supports PMI-1/-2 Special Rework/Crash Damage 
Repair (SR/CD) and Center Barrel Replacement Plus (CBR+). 
d. Manufacturing Program 
The Manufacturing Program has machining, sheet metal fabrication, 
tube/hose/duct repair, foundry, welding and heat treatment capabilities that support the 
aircraft and helicopter rework programs as well as the overhaul of the LM2500 marine 
gas turbine engine used on surface naval ships. This department also manufactures and 
repairs over 150 different configurations of mobile VANS, large steel containers with 
special equipment that support deployed Marine Corps Units. 
e. Engineering and Logistics Program 
The Engineering and Logistics Program is part of the In-Service Support 
Center (ISSC) and consists of a full Materials Laboratory and the Navy Primary 
Standards Laboratory (NPSL). This program is responsible for developing the safest, 
most reliable and cost-effective engineering solutions needed to meet or exceed the 
repair, refurbishment and modifications requirement for products. 
f. Multi-Line Program 
The Multi-Line Program supports PMI-1/-2 for UH-1/HH-1 Huey, CH-53 
Super Stallion, AH-1W Super Cobra and SH-60/MH-60/HH-60 Seahawk helicopters for 
the Navy and Marine Corps. 
g. Field Service/Voyager Repair Program 
The Field Service/Voyager Repair Program is comprised of Voyager 
Repair teams, Field Service teams, paint/finish and surface/structural repair support for 
AV-8B Harrier aircraft in Yuma, Arizona. 
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E. CHAPTER CONTENTS 
This report is presented in seven chapters.  Chapter I is a discussion of the 
purpose of the report followed by the definition of an industry analysis, a brief 
introduction to FRCSW’s position in the AMRO market and finally the current offerings 
at FRCSW.  Chapter II provides an overview of both the commercial and military AMRO 
industries by market segment.  Chapter III includes a discussion about aviation 
maintenance in the U.S. Navy, specifically the levels of maintenance and the evolution of 
public/private partnerships.  Chapter IV presents an analysis of the military AMRO 
market by examining the competitive forces acting upon participants in the market and 
specifically FRCSW.  The forces discussed in Chapter IV will include the bargaining 
power of the suppliers, bargaining power of the buyers, threat of new entrants into the 
industry, threat of substitute products, and current industry rivals.  Chapter V presents an 
analysis of the military AMRO market by examining the macro-environment within 
which the industry operates.  This examination is done by discussing the impact of the 
following factors: Politics, Economy, Social, and Technology, known as a PEST analysis.  
Chapter VI identifies the Key Success Factors, those factors that are required for a 
business, specifically FRCSW, to remain competitive in the AMRO industry.  Chapter 
VII summarizes the findings and presents FRCSW with recommendations as well as 
presenting future opportunities for research to supplement our findings.  
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II. THE AVIATION MAINTENANCE, REPAIR AND OVERHAUL 
INDUSTRY 
A. INTRODUCTION TO AMRO 
To strategically plan, a firm must first fully analyze the industry within which it 
competes in order to recognize both emerging industry trends and future market forecasts 
(Palmer & Kaplan, 2007).  An innovative firm will look beyond its current market 
position, taking a holistic approach to strategic planning, to identify current trends or 
create future trends. “To capitalize on the latent opportunities that reside within trends, 
organizations must move beyond a uni-dimensional understanding of the future (Kaplan 
& Johnston, 1998).”  Strategic planning requires a firm to look forward and make 
estimates about the direction of the industry within which they compete.  Planning is a 
continuous activity that requires a firm to “engage in processes that define an explicit 
linkage between the evolving external environment, potential growth opportunities, and 
business strategies/tactics (InnovationPoint, 2007).” The AMRO industry is comprised of 
private firms competing for work in both defense and commercial markets, and military 
depots competing for work in the defense market. Military aviation depots are 
government (DoD) owned and are operated to fulfill the maintenance requirements set 
forth by the individual services aviation enterprise.  The primary mission of these depots 
is to provide MRO services to military aircraft through application of their own core 
competencies. Each service has its own unique aviation depot capability with the 
exception of the U.S. Marine Corps, whose aircraft are serviced by Naval Aviation 
depots.   
Private firms own and operate facilities and equipment to provide AMRO services 
to commercial airline operators and supplement military aviation depots through 
public/private partnerships3.  These firms are organized and operated as follows: 1) an in-
house subsidiary of a corporate airline operator, 2) an Original Equipment Manufacturer 
(OEM), or 3) a Third Party Independent.  Commercial airlines can establish in-house 
                                                 
3 Public/Private Partnerships are discussed further in Chapter III. 
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maintenance capabilities to provide AMRO services to their own fleets and to operate as 
profit centers; although it is not uncommon for airlines operators to spin-off these 
AMROs to act as a separate corporate activity (Carpenter & Henderson, 2008).  In-house 
AMROs most closely resemble the capability offered by military AMRO depots. OEM’s 
provide original equipment such as engines and avionic components to aircraft 
manufacturers during original assembly and offer maintenance support during the life-
cycle of the aircraft.  These OEMs are able to bundle services at the point of sale and 
provide superior technical capabilities (Carpenter & Henderson, 2008).  Third Party 
Independents perform similar functions as In-house AMROs but are not affiliated with an 
airline operator.  Independents often provide these services at a lower price.  Therefore, 
independents market themselves as the value proposition over the OEMs and In-house 
MROs (Carpenter & Henderson, 2008).  This relationship is displayed in Figure 2.     
 
 
Figure 2.   Commercial AMRO Industry (From: Choo, 2004) 
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B. MARKET SEGMENTS 
The following sections analyze the military and commercial AMRO markets 
segments, current industry trends and future market forecast.   
1. Military AMRO Market and Segments 
Governments spent an estimated $1.1 trillion on global defense budgets in 2005, 
of which operations, maintenance and personnel to support military weapon systems 
accounted for 71 percent (Stewart, 2005).  During this same time period Operations and 
Maintenance (O&M) for all U.S. weapon systems accounted for approximately 40 
percent, or $210 billion, of the total U.S. DoD budget; “O&M funding is considered one 
of the major components of funding for readiness.  O&M appropriations fund the 
training, supply, and equipment maintenance of military units as well as the infrastructure 
of military bases” (Lepore, 2007).  Depot level AMRO is a component of O&M. 
In 2008, the global military aircraft inventory exceeded 39,000 aircraft with 
maintenance on these aircraft costing governments $60.7 billion (Chrisman, 2008). The 
U.S. accounted for half of this, spending an estimated $31 billion on military AMRO in 
2008.  The next largest individual country was Japan which spent an estimated $2.5 
billion during this period.  
The military AMRO market has four segments: 1) Engines, 2) Components, 3) 
Airframes, and 4) Field Maintenance.  The four segments conducted at military depots 
are defined below: 
• Field Maintenance.  Field maintenance, the largest military AMRO 
segment, is primarily conducted at the Intermediate and Organizational 
level, therefore, it is not covered.   
• Airframe.  Airframe maintenance is the second largest MRO segment, 
accounting for $11.7 billion of global military AMRO spend in 2008 
(Chrisman, 2008).  This segment is dominated by fixed wing fighter/attack 
and rotary wing transport/utility aircraft which comprised over 50 percent 
of all airframe maintenance (Chrisman, 2008).  Airframe maintenance is 
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manpower intensive and is conducted by military depots or private firms 
depending on the organic capability of the nation owning the aircraft 
(Stewart, 2005).   
• Components.  Components are the third largest AMRO segment, 
accounting for $9.6 billion of global military AMRO spend in 2008 
(Chrisman, 2008).  This segment includes, but is not limited to, overhaul 
and repair of major components such as avionics, landing gear and 
associated hydraulic and pneumatic systems, wheels and brakes.  
Component MRO is performed by military depots and OEM’s (Stewart, 
2005). 
• Engines.  Engine maintenance is the smallest AMRO segment, accounting 
for $8.1 billion of global military AMRO spend in 2008 (Chrisman, 2008).  
This segment is consolidated; General Electric (41 percent) and Pratt & 
Whitney (29 percent) make-up the majority of the segment.  Engine 
maintenance is classified as on-aircraft or off-aircraft and, depending on 
the level of complexity, can be conducted by all levels of military 
maintenance and by OEM’s (Stewart, 2005). 
2. Commercial AMRO Market and Segments 
The global commercial AMRO industry, valued at $45.1 billion in 2008, is highly 
dependent upon the fiscal health of the commercial airline industry (Doan, 2008). In 2007 
the airline industry realized its first profits since 2001 (Doan, 2007). The commercial 
airline industry had spent the previous six years recovering from the negative affects the 
events of September 11, 2001 had on global airline travel.   
The global commercial airline fleet inventory includes more than 18,000 aircraft 
and is segmented into three categories: 1) Narrow body, 2) Wide body and 3) Regional 
jets (Marcontell, 2009).  A narrow body aircraft has a cabin diameter between 10 and 13 
feet and accounts for 60 percent of the fleet (Marcontell, 2009). Narrow body aircraft 
capacity ranges from 100 to 250 passengers and can be used in short, medium and long-
haul commutes.  A wide body aircraft has a cabin diameter between 16 and 20 feet and 
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accounts for 23 percent of the fleet (Marcontell, 2009).  Wide body aircraft capacity 
ranges from 200 to 600 passengers and are generally used in long-haul commutes.  
Regional jet is a term used to describe a varying array of smaller aircraft used primarily 
in shorter, regional commutes (Office of the Assistant Secretary For Aviation and 
International Affairs, 1998).  These aircraft generally range in capacity between 16 and 
120 passengers.   
The global commercial AMRO market is concentrated, with North America (37 
percent) and Western Europe (27 percent) accounting for nearly two-thirds of all AMRO 
work performed in 2007 (Doan, 2008).  AMRO services cost commercial airline 
operators between $300 and $1,800 per flight hour depending on the type, age and 
condition of the aircraft (Carpenter & Henderson, 2008).  These expenditures, along with 
fuel and labor, comprise the majority of operating cost for commercial airlines.   
The commercial AMRO industry has four segments: 1) Line Maintenance, 2) 
Heavy Maintenance, 3) Components and 4) Engines.  The four segments conducted at 
commercial AMRO’s are defined below:  
• Line Maintenance.  “Line maintenance diagnoses and corrects troubles on 
the aircraft and carries out minor and major aircraft checks and repairs” 
(Carpenter & Henderson, 2008).  Line maintenance is very labor intensive 
and, in 2008, accounted for 18 percent, or $8.1 billion, of the global 
commercial AMRO market (Doan, 2008). 
• Components.  “Component maintenance refers to repairs made to 
components such as wheels, brakes and interior components (Carpenter & 
Henderson, 2008).”  Component maintenance is often very technical in 
nature and, in 2008, accounted for 19 percent, or $8.7 billion, of the global 
commercial AMRO market (Doan, 2008).   
• Heavy Maintenance.  “Heavy maintenance encompasses structural 
modifications, landing gear repair, engine changes and regular calendar 
checks (Carpenter & Henderson, 2008).”  Heavy maintenance is labor 
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intensive and, in 2008, accounted for 21 percent, or $9.1 billion, of the 
global commercial AMRO market (Doan, 2008). 
• Engines.  “Engine maintenance includes dismantling, inspecting, 
assembling and testing aircraft engines (Carpenter & Henderson, 2008).”  
Engines represent the largest segment and, in 2008, accounted for 42 
percent, or $18.8 billion, of the global commercial AMRO market (Doan, 
2008). 
C. AMRO INDUSTRY TRENDS 
• Outsourcing.  Military depots and private firms are increasingly seeking 
opportunities to outsource services they do not consider to be core 
competencies.  “An increase in the level of outsourcing is believed to be 
driving growth in the global aircraft MRO market. Outsourcing provides 
total cost advantage, offers more flexibility to operators, gives 
independent MROs opportunity to form credible network and affords key 
advantages to larger players. Independent MROs have the ability to offer 
more value4. Large players will adapt to possible additional regulations 
that may moderate outsourcing growth to an extent (Butler International, 
2008).”   
• Labor shortage.  A lack of qualified technical labor and experienced 
executives for both military depots and private firms has increased worker 
wages and decreased productivity.  “The challenges are recruiting top 
management, filling the floor with experienced mechanics and managing 
the shrinking customer base (Edmunds, 2008).” 
• Consolidation.  Consolidation by military depots (BRAC) and private 
firms is primarily conducted to improve the competitive environment 
within which they operate and to create efficiencies across the supply 
                                                 
4 Independent MROs do not have the same overhead cost structure as in-house and OEMs, therefore, 
are able to offer lower prices.   They also compete in niche markets that in-house and OEMs are unable or 
unwilling to compete in, creating greater value to their customers. 
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chain.  The global nature of the industry has many seeking consolidation 
opportunities (Edmunds, 2008); “ensuring compliance and adherence to 
the rules is not simple or standardized.  Consolidation will enable the top 
tier MROs to offer more closely aligned practices of rules enforcement” 
(Edmunds, 2008).   
D. FUTURE MARKET FORECAST 
• Commercial.  The global commercial airline inventory is projected to 
grow at a rate of 4.6 percent between 2008 and 2018.  This represents an 
increase of over 10,000 aircraft to the global fleet (Doan, 2008).  During 
this same period the commercial AMRO market is forecasted to grow at a 
rate of 4.3 percent, from $45.1 billion to $68.6 billion. 
• Military.  The global military aircraft inventory is projected to decline 
from approximately 39,000 aircraft in 2008 to below 38,000 aircraft by 
2018.  These totals include new deliveries and the loss of retired aircraft 
(Chrisman, 2008).  During this same period the global military AMRO 
market is forecasted to grow from $60.7 billion to nearly $65 billion; 
much of this growth is attributed to increased cost of maintenance on 
existing, mature aircraft (Jackman, 2005).  
E. INDUSTRY SUMMARY 
Competing in the AMRO Industry requires both military depots and private firms 
to continuously analyze the external environment within which they operate.  Both 
military and commercial markets are heavily influenced by factors beyond their control: 
political decisions (military) and the health of the airline industry (commercial).  Both 
markets are projected to grow steadily over the next decade but the recent global credit 
crises will influence both commercial AMRO spending, the deployment of military 
aircraft, and the subsequent maintenance to those aircraft.  These factors, discussed in 
detail in the following chapters, necessitate the need for FRCSW to strategically plan for 
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III. AVIATION MAINTENANCE IN THE U.S. NAVY 
A. THE TRADITIONAL THREE LEVELS OF MAINTENANCE5 
The organizational, intermediate, and depot levels of aviation maintenance are 
distinctive in organization, mission and concept. Listed below is a brief synopsis of each 
level’s responsibility to the Naval Aviation Maintenance Program. 
1. Organizational 
Organizational level (O-level) is performed by an operating unit on a day-to-day 
basis in support of its own operations.  The O-level’s maintenance mission is to maintain 
assigned aircraft and aeronautical equipment in a Full Mission Capable (FMC) status 
while continually improving the local maintenance processes.  While O-level 
maintenance may be done by intermediate (I-level) or depot level (D-level) activities, O-
level maintenance is usually accomplished by maintenance personnel assigned to aircraft 
reporting custodians (Commander Naval Air Forces, 2009).  Aircraft-reporting 
custodians are responsible for the administrative reporting and maintenance of weapons 
systems in their custody.  Squadrons, such as, VFA-34, VF-101, HM-14, HSC-26 are 
examples of O-level activities (or units).  These O-level activities are assigned aircraft, 
equipment, and personnel that provide direct support to the warfighter. These 
maintenance functions generally are grouped under the categories of inspections, 
servicing, handling, on-equipment repairs, preventive maintenance, and upkeep 
(Commander Naval Air Forces, 2009). 
2. Intermediate 
The I-level’s mission is to enhance and sustain the combat readiness and mission 
capability of supported activities by providing quality and timely material support at the 
nearest location with the lowest practical resource expenditure (Commander Naval Air 
Forces, 2009).  I-level maintenance consists of on- and off-equipment material support. 
                                                 
5 Section A with minor modification is drawn directly from, F. R. Clemmons and, H. M. Falconieri, 
“Analysis of Fleet Readiness Center Southwest Concept Integration: New-Employee Orientation and 
Communications Process,” (MBA Project, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007), 3-4. 
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On-equipment maintenance is conducted on the aircraft/end-item.  On-equipment 
maintenance includes the repair of installed engines, calibration of systems, or repair of 
support equipment.  Off-equipment maintenance is conducted when the component/item 
is removed from the aircraft/end item and repaired at the facility.  Off-equipment 
maintenance includes the processing of aircraft components; incorporation of technical 
directives; provision of technical assistance; the manufacture of selected components, 
liquids, or gases; and performance of certain on-equipment repairs (Commander Naval 
Air Forces, 2009). 
3. Depot 
The D-level’s maintenance is performed at or by the Naval aviation industrial 
establishment to ensure continued flying integrity of airframes and flight systems during 
subsequent operational service periods.  D-level maintenance is also performed on 
material requiring major overhaul of parts, assemblies, sub-assemblies, and end-items 
beyond the capability of I-level.  D-level maintenance includes manufacturing parts, 
modifying, testing, inspecting, sampling, and reclamation (Commander Naval Air Forces, 
2009).  D-level maintenance supports O-level and I-level maintenance by providing 
engineering assistance and performing maintenance beyond O-level and I-level 
capabilities (Commander Naval Air Forces, 2009). 
B. U.S. CODE TITLE 10 PUBLIC/PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 
In 2001, the House and Senate Armed Services Committees (HASC and SASC, 
respectively) determined that an effort, to compensate for the infrastructure losses caused 
by BRAC, needed to be undertaken.  In response to the infrastructure losses the HASC 
and SASC instituted two additional laws in Title 10, sections 2466 and 2474.  These two 
laws provided for the establishment of public/private partnerships for conducting depot-
level repair and set forth the laws under which these partnerships would function.  U.S. 
Code Title 10 Section 2474 establishes the precedent for Secretary of Defense approval 
of public/private joint ventures and Section 2466 establishes the limitations on the 
amount of funds that can be contracted to private firms.  The following section will 
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explore these two laws, discuss the impetus for their inception, how the laws are being 
implemented, and finally discuss current problems these joint ventures are experiencing.   
1. Application of the Law 
The formulation of the laws relating to public/private partnerships and the 
limitation of private maintenance contracting in 2001 were in response to the efforts, over 
the previous 13 years, of Congress to dramatically reduce the number of military bases 
through BRAC. BRAC is a joint effort between DoD and Congress to close excess 
military installations with the purpose of saving money, aligning the current defense 
goals with the force structure and maximizing efficiency.  A complicating issue resulting 
from the closure of these bases was the loss of manufacturing, maintenance and depot-
level repair facilities.  Force structures can be realigned and military units reassigned; 
however, difficulties exist in replacing the loss of civilian technicians who have the 
expertise, knowledge and skills necessary to conduct repairs to highly technical military 
equipment (Holman, Denman, Epstein, Knoepfle, Waytel, & Newton, 1998). 
In an effort to compensate for the loss of military industrial capabilities and 
technical expertise, while at the same time creating private-sector jobs for the highly 
skilled civilian technicians released under BRAC, the U.S. Congress added Section 2474 
to Title 10. Section 2474 stipulates that the Secretary of Defense “shall designate each 
depot-level activity of the military departments and the Defense Agencies…as a Center 
of Industrial and Technical Excellence (CITE) in the recognized core competencies of the 
designee” (U.S. House of Representatives, 2008).  A CITE is defined as a maintenance 
facility that provides the military with a means of conducting depot-level repairs on 
implements directly related to the core competencies of each individual branch (U.S. 
House of Representatives, 2008).  A core competency is defined as the “capabilities 
necessary to enable the Armed Forces to fulfill the strategic and contingency plans 
prepared by the Joint chiefs of Staff and for which the Military Departments believe the 
DoD should be a recognized leader in the national technology and industrial base” 
(Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions Technology and Logisitics , 2007).  For 
example, Fleet Readiness Center Southwest in San Diego is designated as a CITE due to 
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its capability to conduct maintenance, repair and overhaul on naval aircraft, an implement 
in executing the Naval core competency of projection of power from the seas.  In short, 
the purpose of the redesignation is additional focus on both best-business practices and 
core competencies through the encouragement of public/private partnerships (U.S. Army 
Materiel Command, 2004).  The designation of CITEs attempts to reduce overall 
government expenditure on capital resources while maintaining the necessary industrial 
base to effect depot-level repairs. 
The law provides a mechanism for depots both to solicit and outsource work 
through the use of contracts with private firms.  The more common is outsourcing, to 
private firms, additional work that a depot either does not have the capability to perform 
or does not have the capacity to conduct at the present time (Hunter, 2006).  However, 
the law also allows DoD depots to manufacture military-related goods for distribution to 
private firms.  The law stipulates that goods sold in this manner must be utilized for 
direct military application.  In effect, this law provides a means for private firms to bid 
for depot-level repair work as needed by DoD, and DoD to bid for work from private 
firms that fall within their core competencies.  This application is articulated further in 
the MATCOM Depot-Level Maintenance Program for the Marine Corps in the following 
manner: “Partnerships can range from joint public-private undertakings, to private sector 
participation in some aspect of DoD depot maintenance production, to direct sales of 
articles or services to the private sector, or to leasing of DoD facilities or equipment” 
(U.S. Marine Corps Material Command, 2004).  Under this interpretation, it is feasible 
for a command to engage private sector participants in any portion of DoD depot-level 
maintenance as both an outsourcing partner and a source for additional work to fill 
capacity. 
U.S. Code Title 10 articulates the intentions of Congress to more fully utilize 
CITEs while encouraging private funding.  The law directs a series of six expectations 
from this program: 1) encourage the private usage of the government workforce to ensure 
an adequate industrial base and work force exists to meet the needs of the armed forces, 
2) maximize utilization of CITE capacities, 3) lower maintenance overhead costs, 4) 
encourage private sector investments in joint ventures and recapitalization, 5) lower cost 
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of DoD maintenance, and 6) increase cooperation between private and DoD industry 
(U.S. House of Representatives, 2008).  The application of these expectations was 
assigned to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) to both select and designate CITEs, and 
then implement the public/private programs that will supplement the CITEs.  This 
authority was delegated to the Service Secretaries to assess each branch’s core 
competencies and provide the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) with a list of industrial 
centers providing the essential depot repair capabilities to service these core 
competencies.  The CITE designation process was initiated in 2001 but has been in 
constant revision ever since (Secretary of the Navy, 2002).   
The establishment of private/public partnerships is handled on a case by case 
basis with each individual partnership requiring the formulation of a business case 
analysis detailing the advantages gained by both parties (Hunter, 2006).  The 
development of a business case is an endeavor requiring 18 to 36 months of manpower 
and logistical support to ensure that all portions of the intended agreement are clearly 
articulated and that each side understands the limitations of the partnership (Hunter, 
2006).  Business case development includes, but is not limited to, a discussion of 
expected performance, producibility, reliability, maintainability, and supportability 
enhancements (Defense Acquisiton University, 2009).  The process is similar to the 
writing of a contract and is guided by instructions covering Performance Based Logistics 
(Defense Acquisiton University, 2009).  The completed business case analysis is then 
submitted to a Systems Command (SYSCOM) level official (Flag/Senior Executive 
Service) for approval.  Following the review by the SYSCOM, the business case analysis 
is then reviewed by the comptroller and a letter of approval is forwarded to the Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy for Research Development and Acquisitions (ASNRD&A) 
(Secretary of the Navy, 2002).  This process has created numerous inefficiencies 
discussed further in following sections. 
2. Fifty Percent Law 
U.S. Code Title 10 Section 2474 creates the possibility of the military outsourcing 
a significant portion of its depot repairs to private firms if those civilian depots can 
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conduct the maintenance at a lower cost and similar quality as their military counterparts.  
In anticipation of this issue, Congress instituted Section 2466 of Title 10 which provides 
for the commonly referred to “50 Percent Law.”  Section 2466 stipulates that “Not more 
than 50 percent of the funds made available in a fiscal year to a military department or a 
Defense Agency for depot-level maintenance and repair workload may be used to 
contract for the performance by non-Federal Government personnel of such workload for 
the military department or the Defense Agency” (U.S. House of Representatives, 2008). 
In practice, this provides the military with an opportunity to outsource either all or 
a portion of the repairs on a specific piece of equipment.  The requirement stipulates only 
that at least 50 percent of DoD depot-level maintenance funding be spent at the military 
depots.  The SECDEF is required to report the percentages of expenditure for depot-level 
repairs to Congress on 1 August each year (U.S. House of Representatives, 2008). 
Examples of successful partnerships existed prior to the adoption of sections 2474 
and 2466 of Title 10 including the M1 Recuperator Facility Use at Anniston by 
Honeywell (Lease under 10 U.S.C. 4543) and the Firefinder Block II Program at 
Tobyhanna with Raytheon (Sale of services under 10 U.S.C. 2208(j)) (Hunter, 2006).  
These partnerships, however, fell under various specific Title 10 codes, as indicated 
above, and required specific congressional consent in Title 10 to exist.  The adoption of 
sections 2474 and 2466 allow these partnerships to be developed and approved within 
DoD, only requiring that they meet the applicable statutes contained within these 
sections.  Partnerships existing prior to the institution of sections 2474 and 2466 are 
included in the private portion of the 50 Percent Law (Hunter, 2006). 
Partnerships developed that are non-statutory and now exist under sections 2474 
and 2466 include: “the M1/M1A2 Upgrade at Anniston Army Depot with General 
Dynamics and the Multiple Launch Rocket System M270A1 at Red River with Lockheed 
Martin” (U.S. Army Materiel Command, 2004).  A partnership that outsources all repairs 
is usually associated with new items in the inventory, where the government maintenance 




firm has those capabilities.  An example of this is the case of General Dynamics 
conducting all Stryker refurbishments until Anniston Army Depot was able to get 
necessary support equipment on line (Hunter, 2006).  
An analysis of FY 2004 public/private partnerships by service is detailed in the 
graphic below. 
 
Figure 3.   Fiscal Year 2004 and Earlier Public-Private Partnerships by Service  
(From: Hunter, 2006) 
The Army, in effort to further the success of these partnerships, has conducted an 
assessment of the best practices from the other services and has determined that: “the 
most effective partnerships are those that focus on enhancing performance of the supply 
chain while driving down costs” (U.S. Army Materiel Command, 2004).  
3. Problems with Public/Private Partnerships 
In an effort to understand the key success factors and assess the effectiveness of a 
fully-integrated CITE, Congress required, under House Conference Report 110-447 
(2007), that DoD and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) conduct an 
expansive analysis of public/private partnerships and their implementation at CITEs 
(Solis, 2008).  The HASC and SASC requested six items be specifically researched: 1) 
approaches to partnership implementation, 2) standardized cost and reimbursement 
guidance for partnerships, 3) procedures for completing partnership contracts within 12 













authority to allow changes in partnerships that do not affect safety, form, fit or function 
of the equipment and 6) plans to expand core capabilities through use of CITEs (Solis, 
2008).  The thrust of this assessment was to ensure a standardized approach was taken in 
the set up, administration and evaluation of partnerships at the CITEs.  In the assessment, 
it was clear that item 3) was believed to be unworkable and that the placement of a 12-
month restriction on contract negotiations would be detrimental to the process (Solis, 
2008).  This accentuates one of the key issues with public/private partnerships, the time 
and resources required to establish the partnerships.  Due to the detail required in 
establishing the relationship and determining the necessary compensation methods, these 
relationships can take upwards of two to four years to establish (Solis, 2008). 
The second major issue found by DoD and GAO was the lack of standardized 
metrics to measure the success or failure of a partnership (Solis, 2008).  The DoD, as of 
July 2008, has not standardized any form of metrics even within a particular branch 
(Solis, 2008).  The current methodology used assesses each partnership on a case by case 
basis in much the same way as each case first is approved.  The standardization of both 
the application process and the assessment process would facilitate the desired process 
required by Congress.  The issue with this approach is the spectrum over which these 
partnerships can spread.  They can include public/private partners working in the same 
facility, partners sharing resources, completely outsourcing a segment of work to a 
partner, or outsourcing entire equipment lines to a partner.  The standardization while 
creating an optimal solution would also create restrictions on the possibilities to which 
the CITEs can utilize these partnerships (Solis, 2008).  DoD further believes it already 
has a working process in use that examines the stated goals of the partnership and 
evaluates the performance of the partnership based upon those goals (Solis, 2008). 
The implementation of the CITE program and the expansion of public/private 
partnerships is designed to allow DoD to manage depot-level maintenance in a more 
fiscally-responsible and rapid fashion.  In 2004, the private partners accounted for only 
2.2% of the $25.4 billion dollars of work performed; however, that figure is growing 
every year (Hunter, 2006). 
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IV. EXTERNAL FORCES ON THE INDUSTRY 
A. INTRODUCTION TO PORTER’S FIVE FORCES6 
Describing the external forces on the industry begins by defining the overarching 
industry structure through an examination of the five-forces of competition acting on the 
industry.  These five forces were defined by Michael Porter, in his book Competitive 
Strategy, as:  1) threat of new entrants, 2) rivalry among existing competitors, 3) threat of 
substitute products, 4) bargaining power of the consumer, and 5) bargaining power of the 
suppliers.  These forces interact with one another as shown in Figure 4.   
 
Figure 4.   Forces Driving Industry Competition (From: Porter, 1980) 
The more clearly-defined the industry within which the firm competes, the more 
accurately the forces of competition can be identified and analyzed.  While narrowing the 
focus of the analysis is critical; it is also critical to ensure all sectors of the firm’s 
operations are represented in the analysis.  If the firm operates in multiple distinct 
industries or markets, it may be necessary to conduct multiple analyses on these different  
                                                 
6 Contents of Section A are summarized from Chapter I of Competitive Strategy by Michael Porter. 
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sectors.  The military AMRO industry is segmented into four distinct markets: 1) field 
maintenance, 2) components, 3) engines and 4) airframes.  FRCSW competes in each of 
these segments, therefore, separate analysis for each segment is required.7 
The development of a military AMRO industry five-forces analysis is critical in 
providing FRCSW with the competitive boundaries within which they operate.  
Determining the competitive boundaries allows the firm to gauge the intensity of the 
competition and anticipate the direction from which this competition may come.  “The 
collective strength of these forces determines the ultimate profit potential in the industry, 
where profit potential is measured in terms of long-term return on invested capital” 
(Porter, 1980).  To become a competitor within the military AMRO industry, a firm 
requires extensive long-term capital investment, thus making long-term return on the 
investment a critical feature of competition.  Although FRCSW operates as a not-for-
profit competitor in the military AMRO industry, the Navy Working Capital Fund and 
U.S.C. Title 10 combine to create an environment within which profit-seeking firms and 
FRCSW compete for business. 
B. THREAT OF NEW ENTRANTS 
The threat of new entrants is the threat posed to the established industry 
competitors by new firms entering either through acquisition or startup.  Acquisition 
firms enter the market either by purchasing a current competitor and rapidly expanding 
that firm’s market share, or by purchasing multiple firms and creating a powerful 
conglomerate.  Startup firms enter the market with large sums of investment capital and 
are can easily capture and exploit the latest military aircraft technology developments.  
These firms typically bring new technologies or improved techniques to the industry that 
may alter the current competitive environment.  Startups and conglomerates experience 
several barriers to entry that must be overcome to establish successful firms. 
 
                                                 
7 “Uniform personnel perform at least 80 percent of field maintenance” (Tegtmeier, 2006), therefore, 
the field maintenance segment will not be assessed.  
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The seven barriers to entry are:  1) economies of scale, 2) product differentiation, 
3) capital requirements, 4) switching costs, 5) access to distribution channels, 6) cost 
disadvantages independent of scale and 7) government policy (Porter, 1980).   
1. Economies of scale represent the cost advantage per unit experienced by firms 
with high volume; this advantage is highly dependent upon variable cost per 
unit.  “Economies of scale deter entry by forcing the entrant to come in at 
large scale and risk strong reaction from existing firms or come in at a small 
scale and accept a cost disadvantage, both undesirable options” (Porter, 1980).   
2. Product differentiation examines the barrier to entry that requires startup firms 
to create brand recognition and make a distinction between a startup’s new 
products and an existing firm’s offerings.   
3. Capital requirements are those barriers that represent large initial investment 
in facilities, workforce, initial advertising, research and development and 
equipment.   
4. Switching costs represent the costs imposed upon customers by changing 
suppliers; these include retraining of employees in the new firm’s procedural 
requirements, geographic constraints that impose additional costs and 
rebuilding of business relationships.   
5. Access to distribution channels examines the complex relationships between 
the web of suppliers and the new entrant, as well as the network required to 
distribute products to customers.   
6. Cost disadvantages independent of scale represent the advantages enjoyed by 
established firms in the industry that are independent of repair volume, and 
could include advantages to established firms that new entrants are unable to 
reproduce. 
7. Restrictions imposed by government policy examine the limits placed on 
firms by resident laws and codes.  
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The following assessment is based upon a compilation of the analysis conducted 
on the seven barriers to entry that follow.8   
1. Economies of Scale 
• All – Due to the size of the military aircraft industry, a world-wide aircraft 
inventory of 39,113 in 2008, the advantages of economies of scale are 
limited in all military AMRO segments (Chrisman, 2008). Limited 
economies of scale increase barriers to entry. 
• Component – New entrants into components that are dual-use, having 
both military and civilian applications, can experience an economy of 
scale; however, products of this type are a fairly limited portion of the 
component segment.  New entrants that can leverage economies of scale 
by utilizing dual-use components can decrease their barriers to entry 
(Armstrong, 2005) (KPMG, 2003). 
• Engine – The engine segment has significant participation by both OEMs 
and Independents, making it an industry segment with open opportunities.  
Governments control only 43 percent of the segment’s market share, 
leaving the remaining 57 percent for OEMs and Independents (Stewart, 
2005).  In the U.S. market the involvement of private firms is reduced, 
with the military AMRO depots controlling 75 percent of the engine 
maintenance activity; however, large European Air Forces receive a 
majority of their maintenance through OEMs or Independents (Stewart, 
2005).  New entrants could leverage the success of European engine MRO 
firms to increase the privatization in U.S. markets, thereby decreasing the 
barriers to entry. 
 
 
                                                 
8 The following analysis applies to the segments listed in bold prior to the explanations.   
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2. Product Differentiation 
• Airframe/Engine – Bundling of service and sales by OEMs provides 
these OEMs with a position of increased strength, as they are able to 
provide discounts to customers on original purchases when made with an 
accompanying service contract (Carpenter & Henderson, 2008).  The 
ability of OEMs to bundle sales and services increases the barriers to entry 
for new firms. 
• Component/Engine – The advent of the FAA’s Parts Manufacturer 
Approval (PMA) process allows non-OEMs to reverse-engineer some 
OEM parts and sell them at a significant discount (Carpenter & 
Henderson, 2008).  PMA parts are gaining wider acceptance, thereby 
decreasing the barrier to entry for PMA parts manufacturers. 
• All – Low-cost competition utilizing PMAs is one of the primary methods 
for a new entrant to differentiate themselves and gain entry into 
government contracting.  Established firms enjoy some recognition but are 
subject to being undercut by new entrants utilizing PMAs in future 
contracts, due to the cost/quality competition standards (Solis, 2008).  
Low product cost presents one method of decreasing the barriers to entry. 
3. Capital Requirement 
• All – Facilities for heavy industry-crafted components, (i.e., landing gear, 
hydraulics equipment, engines and airframes) require significant capital 
investments for new entrants (Carpenter & Henderson, 2008).  FRCSW 
occupies more than 80 buildings and over 2.6 million square feet of 
production area to conduct military AMRO maintenance (Kelly, 2008). 




• All – Specialized equipment for highly technical repairs and testing 
(electronics, avionics and engines) requires large capital investments by 
new entrants (Carpenter & Henderson, 2008).  High capital investment 
requirements lead to increased barriers to entry.  
• All – Operating capital is required to attract the high-quality skilled 
workers necessary for military AMRO.  Most workers in the military 
AMRO industry are members of unions or trade organizations that 
command high pay and compensation packages costing in excess of $80 
per maintenance hour (Sanyal, 2009).  High operating capital requirements 
lead to increased barriers to entry.  Relationships with these Unions are 
discussed further in bargaining power of suppliers.   
• All – Establishment and maintenance of industry certifications such as 
ISO 9000 and AS9100 require large initial capital investments in 
manpower, training and equipment (Kelly, 2008).  Startup firms are more 
heavily exposed to these initial costs than conglomerates.  Rigorous 
industry certification processes present increased barriers to entry. 
• Airframe – Due to a decade of difficult economic times for the 
commercial airline industry (post-9/11 and the global credit crunch), 
commercial ARMO firms have consolidated operations leaving available 
hangar space near large airports for new entrants (Berger, 2005) 
(Marcontell, 2009).  This available hangar space could be obtained by new 
entrants at bargain prices, thereby decreasing barriers to entry. 
4. Switching Cost 
• All – Due to the complexity and number of specialized airframes and 
components, switching to new suppliers can represent significant costs to 




• All – Government contracts are rewarded based upon a compilation of 
data about the competing firms. This compilation includes the assessment 
of risk attributed to each competitor (General Services Administration 
Department of Defence, 2009).  Startup firms pose greater risk than 
established firms, therefore, with all other aspects of the contract held 
even the government will choose the lower risk firm, increasing the barrier 
to entry.  It should be noted that U.S. DoD depots do not require any 
contracts to perform MRO work on U.S. DoD aircraft (Kelly, 2008). 
• All – Government contracts often are let to large prime contractors that 
utilize multiple sub-contractors to complete the obligation.  Competition 
among sub-contractors does not carry the same risk analysis requirement 
by the government; however, the prime will perform its own assessments 
(General Services Administration Department of Defence, 2009).  This 
presents an opportunity for new entrants to establish the necessary 
credentials, thereby possibly lowering the barrier to entry. 
5. Access to Distribution 
• All – Due to the size, scope and intricacies involved in integrating civilian 
and military systems, new entrants experience challenges in establishing 
the necessary administrative functions to support military logistical 
requirements (Kovacic & Schooner, 2005).  These difficulties present 
increased barriers to new entrants. 
• All – Certain sensitive components require quality assurance 
documentation that enables the end user to track component issues back to 
the original repair facility and that facility’s supply chain (Commander 
Naval Air Forces, 2009).  Maintenance of the required database on these 
components can create additional expenses for new entrants, increasing 
the barriers to entry. 
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• All – Necessary shipping procedures for handling classified and sensitive 
material expose new entrants to additional training and equipment costs.  
Obtaining security clearances can cost up to $3,700 per clearance needed 
(Farrell, 2008).  These additional expenses can increase the barriers to 
entry. 
6. Cost Disadvantages Independent of Scale 
• All – Access to OEM documentation and technical expertise necessary to 
effect repairs requires new entrants to establish both business and working 
relationships with these OEMs (Carpenter & Henderson, 2008).  The 
information necessary to conduct repairs often is proprietary and requires 
licensing to access.  The cost of licensing access increases the barriers to 
entry. 
• All – For firms to remain competitive in the aerospace industry, they are 
required to obtain and maintain AS9100 certification.  This certifies that 
parts and maintenance done by these firms meet the minimum 
qualifications required for aerospace suppliers (Society for Automotive 
Engineers, 2007).  Investments required to obtain industry certifications 
increase the barriers to entry. 
• All – New entrants must establish the necessary work force with security 
clearances that will allow for work on classified and sensitive components 
(Secretary of the Navy, 2006).  Obtaining these security clearances is a 
lengthy and expensive process requiring interaction with multiple 
government agencies (Farrell, 2008).  The cost of obtaining initial security 
clearances increases the barriers to entry. 
• All – Due to the nature of the equipment repairs and the possible impact 
on national security, repair facilities may require extensive physical 
security to safeguard government equipment (Chandler, 2005).  Increased 
physical security costs create increased barriers to entry. 
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7. Government Policies 
• All – As discussed in Chapter III, U.S.C. Title 10 requires that military 
depots maintain at least 50 percent of the depot maintenance work to 
ensure the retention of core competencies.  As more firms enter the 
AMRO industry, and industry forecasts predict slow growth (less than 2 
percent), competition for the available work will increase (Chrisman, 
2008).  Greater competition for available work increases barriers to entry. 
• All – Many government contracts are let on a lifecycle basis and firms 
receiving these contracts retain the right to repair work on certain 
components throughout the life of the airframe program (General Services 
Administration Department of Defence, 2009).  Existence of lifecycle 
maintenance contracts decreases the number of available contracts and, 
therefore, increases barriers to entry. 
New entrants into the military AMRO industry experience a wide variety of 
barriers to entry.  Successful firms find a niche market, or create cooperative alliances 
with other small AMRO firms to begin operations, working to expand market share over 
time (Butler International, 2008) (Michaels, 2008).  Opportunities also exist for 
commercial AMROs experiencing declining market share due to decreased commercial 
airline activity; these AMROs can seek entry into the military AMRO market as a way to 
leverage idle resources for additional profit opportunities (Magalhaes, 2004).  Although 
the threat of new entry exists, “Players in the aerospace and defense market are becoming 
increasingly large integrated multinational companies” (Datamonitor, 2008). 
C. RIVALRY AMONG EXISTING COMPETITORS 
Rivalry among existing competitors is the threat posed to the industry by 
increasing competition between existing firms.  “Rivalry occurs because one or more 
competitors either feels the pressure or sees the opportunity to improve position” (Porter, 
1980).  In the military AMRO industry, like many other industries, outsourcing has 
become key to firms increasing their competitive position by concentrating on their core 
competencies and divesting non-profitable interests (Stewart, 2005).  Due to the 
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requirements of U.S.C. Title 10, military depots, who in the past were the exclusive 
suppliers of depot level repairs to the DoD aviation enterprise, now must compete with 
commercial firms and each other.  The opening of competition to independent 
commercial firms is designed to create a downward pressure on military MRO prices, 
thereby benefiting the DoD as a whole.  Individual military depots, in an effort to remain 
competitive, have instituted AMRO practices such as Theory of Constraints, LEAN and 
Six Sigma.  The following paragraphs examine the forces applied on the military AMRO 
industry segments by the rivalry among existing competitors. 
Porter defines the rivalry among competitors as a compilation of many factors; 
not all factors apply in every industry.  These factors are the balance of competition, rate 
of industry growth, fixed costs, differentiation or switching costs, ability to adjust for 
changes in capacity, diversity of competitors, strategic interest of competitors, exit 
barriers and changes in factors defining the rivalry (Porter, 1980).  Assessment of the 
balance of competition examines the volatility of the rivalry due to firms attempting to 
create a competitive advantage.  Assessment of the rate-of-industry growth examines how 
firms adjust to capture the limited market share available as an industry matures.  
Assessment of fixed costs examines what adjustments are made by rivals to ensure they 
maintain operations at capacity.  Assessment of differentiation or switching costs 
examines the loyalty of consumers of the industry to specific brands or firms.  
Assessment of the ability of firms to adjust for changes in capacity examines how 
dependant firms in the industry are on maintaining high volumes of production.  
Assessment of diversity of competitors examines how commonality of backgrounds and 
executive personalities affects the industry.  Assessment of competitor’s strategic interest 
examines how critical this industry is to a firm active in multiple industries.  Assessment 
of exit barriers examines the economic, strategic, or personal factors preventing a firm 
from exiting the industry.  Assessment of the changes defining the rivalry examines how 




Assessment of the rivalry forces in the military AMRO industry is based upon a 
compilation of the analysis conducted on each of the segments that follow.  Component 
and engine segments have similarities in the way in which rivalry affects competitors; 
therefore, their analysis is combined into one section.  
1. Engine and Component 
• These segments are populated with various firms, from small single focus 
businesses to large conglomerates who supply components and engines as 
a small portion of their firm’s offerings (Berger, 2005).  Unbalanced, 
diverse, and highly populated industries decrease rivalry forces. 
• The military AMRO component and engine segments are projected to 
grow 10.4 percent and 9.6 percent, respectively, by 2018 (Doan, 2008).  
High industry growth rates decrease rivalry forces.   
• Low switching costs in the component sector are experienced only in the 
high volume commodities; lower volume, highly-specialized components 
impart extensive switching costs to the consumer and decrease rivalry 
forces (Butler International, 2008).   
• Depending upon the volume and specialization of the particular 
component, firms may or may not experience high exit barriers (Butler 
International, 2008).  Greater technical specialization combined with high 
initial capital investments in equipment and facilities can create high exit 
barriers, thereby increasing rivalry forces.   
2. Airframe 
• In the United States, where more than 70 percent of the airframe MRO is 
done by DoD air depots, the segment of airframe maintenance available 
for competition is small, with OEMs carrying the bulk of the available 
contracts (Stewart, 2005).  Lack of similarly-sized competitors decreases 
rivalry forces. 
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• Due to the nature of airframe MRO, expansive investment in initial capital 
creates high exit barriers, which could lead to firms engaging in price wars 
in effort to remain viable (Hemmati, Randell, Monk, & Pettigrew, 2008).  
High exit barriers increase rivalry forces. 
• Many airframes, particularly fighters and special mission aircraft, require 
specialized airframe maintenance only available at specific sites, usually 
government sites, creating high or unavailable switching costs (Stewart, 
2005).  Switching costs are unavailable when government laws and 
regulations prevent private depots from conducting repairs.  High 
switching costs lead to decreasing rivalry forces. 
• Some government-owned depots were built with excess capacity, 
providing these depots with the opportunity to draw additional work when 
not required for surge operation support (Choo, 2004).  This increases 
rivalry forces between government-owned depots, especially due to recent 
BRAC events. 
Threats from rivals in the military AMRO industry come both from privately-
owned firms, and other government depots.  BRAC 2005 consolidated depot maintenance 
in all branches of the military in effort to expedite 2001 revisions to U.S.C. Title 10 
allowing for increased private competition in military AMRO.  Increasing pressure from 
the DoD budget and Congress could lead to more extensive outsourcing of military 
AMRO work to private firms and further consolidation of government depots (Stewart, 
2005).  As the opportunity for improved market position in the military AMRO industry 
presents itself to private firms, the rivalry forces in the marketplace will increase (Porter, 
1980). 
D. THREAT OF SUBSTITUTE PRODUCTS 
The threat of substitute products describes those products outside the industry that 
have the ability to perform the same or similar function as the industry’s current 
offerings.  “Substitutes limit the potential returns of an industry by placing a ceiling on 
the prices firms in the industry can profitably charge” (Porter, 1980).  The current power 
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projected by military aircraft on the battlefield makes them essential for any military 
action.  The continued employment of military aircraft is dependent upon maintenance 
support for these aircraft.  Continued operation of any aircraft requires extensive 
maintenance; the military aviation enterprises conduct this maintenance based upon flight 
hours (Commander Naval Air Forces, 2009).  Therefore, as long as aircraft continue to 
fly, maintenance on these aircraft will be required, making AMRO an irreplaceable 
feature of aviation enterprises.  The following paragraphs examine the threat that 
substitute products pose to the military aviation enterprise as a whole and, thereby, the 
military AMRO industry. 
All segments of military AMRO are presented with similar substitution threats; 
therefore, the following analysis applies to all segments. 
• The advent and success of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have led to 
UAVs replacing some of the mission sets of manned aircraft.  UAVs 
typically cost ~$3–$4 million per copy (Global Security, 2007) while an 
F/A-18 E/F typically costs ~$57 million per copy (NAVAIRSYSCOM, 
2009).  While a UAV cannot perform all the mission sets required of the 
F/A-18, it can perform some of them, and at a significant cost advantage 
in not only initial purchase cost but in operations and maintenance.  With 
UAVs being less expensive, they are more expendable and could reduce 
the need for MRO and thus increase the threat of substitute products. 
• New airframes are designed with lifecycle cost considerations in mind, 
and the attempt to decrease maintenance requirements is paramount in the 
engineering process (Stewart, 2005).  New lower-maintenance engineering 
of aircraft could present a reduction of the current high cost of maintaining 
legacy aircraft.  While not a complete substitution to AMRO, the 
introduction of lifecycle engineering could reduce the amount of AMRO 
required, thereby increasing the threat of substitute products. 
• The development of new technology, such as jet propulsion over propeller 
propulsion, can create threats of substitution within the industry. 
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There are no direct substitute products/services for military AMRO; however, the 
introduction of new technology or the assessment of a new need may lead DoD to acquire 
substitute products for the current aviation enterprise.  Introduction of substitute products 
in the aviation enterprise would require military AMRO depots to adjust their offerings to 
provide services for the new substitute products.  An example of this adjustment is seen 
in the development and expanding use of UAVs on the battlefield. While it is yet 
undecided if UAVs provide significant cost savings in the acquisition process or in 
operations, it is generally accepted that there will be savings in maintenance costs (Bone 
& Bolkcom, 2003).  Increased maintenance savings through extensive use of UAVs or 
through decreased flight hours for manned aircraft increase the substitute pressure on the 
military AMRO market. 
E. BARGAINING POWER OF THE CONSUMER 
The bargaining power of the consumer is the control exercised over the 
competitors in the industry by the actions of the consumers.  “The power of each of the 
industry’s important buyer groups depends on a number of characteristics of its market 
situation, and on the relative importance of its purchases from the industry compared with 
its overall business” (Porter, 1980).  Porter explains that consumers hold significant 
power over an industry if they are: 1) concentrated, 2) their purchases represent a 
significant fraction of buyer’s costs, 3) the products purchased from the industry are 
standard/undifferentiated, 4) switching costs are low, 5) profits are low, 6) a credible 
threat to backward integration exist, 7) industry quality is unimportant to the consumers’ 
product/services or 8) the buyer has full information about the seller’s industry.  
Consumers in the military AMRO industry are defined as U.S. and foreign military 
aviation enterprises and the private AMRO industry via public private partnerships.  The 
following paragraphs examine the forces applied on the military AMRO industry 




Bargaining power of consumers is similar throughout all segments of military 
AMRO; however, certain segments experience this to slightly different degrees.  
• By their nature, military AMRO services are purchased by government 
military aviation enterprises, leading to a concentrated and integrated 
customer base which exerts increased customer bargaining power over the 
industry (Stewart, 2005). 
• Military aviation enterprises have few options for maintenance; however, 
this has occurred because these enterprises have backward integrated into 
the military AMRO market.  Recent Title 10 changes have lessened this 
affect and have fostered a more competitive environment; however, 
backward integration into the AMRO industry continues to increase the 
bargaining power of the military aviation enterprises over the depots 
(Stewart, 2005). 
• Operations, maintenance and personnel account for over 70 percent of the 
global defense budget.  The U.S. military spent $24.3 billion, out of a 
$379.9 billion defense budget, on aircraft maintenance in 2004 (Stewart, 
2005).  Due to the proportion of DoD funds spent on AMRO, the industry 
represents a significant fraction of the DoD aviation enterprise’s 
purchases.  Consumers who spend a large fraction of their budget on a 
single industry, military AMRO in this case, have increased bargaining 
power over that industry due to the customer’s price sensitivity. 
• The AMRO industry requires high levels of quality to be maintained in all 
maintenance actions due to the risk to pilots and crew of the aircraft 
(Commander Naval Air Forces, 2009) (Kelly, 2008).  These increased 
requirements for quality decrease the bargaining power of the military 
aviation enterprise; however, this industry is large, and quality is enforced 
through the application of industry standards and government regulations, 
mitigating the loss of consumer power (Commander Naval Air Forces, 
2009). 
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• Military aviation enterprises set the standards required for maintenance on 
their aircraft and require full disclosure of all expenditures; thereby giving 
them full information and increased bargaining power (Commander Naval 
Air Forces, 2009) (General Services Administration Department of 
Defence, 2009). 
Consumers in the military AMRO market are concentrated, integrated, have full 
knowledge and a significant portion of their budgets invested in the industry; thereby 
increasing the bargaining power of military aviation enterprises. 
F. BARGAINING POWER OF THE SUPPLIERS 
“The conditions making suppliers powerful mirror those making buyers powerful.  
Suppliers can exert bargaining power over participants in an industry by threatening to 
raise prices or reduce the quality of purchased goods and services” (Porter, 1980).  Porter 
explains that suppliers hold significant power over an industry if the suppliers are: 1) 
dominated by a few companies, 2) not obliged to compete with other substitute products 
to the industry, 3) the industry is not an important customer of the supplier group, 4) the 
supplier’s product is an important input to the buyer’s business, 5) the supplier group’s 
products are differentiated or have built-up switching costs, or 6) the supplier group poses 
a creditable threat of forward integration.  Suppliers in the AMRO industry are defined as 
labor, raw materials, logistics services and commodity components.  The following 
paragraphs examine the forces applied on the military AMRO industry segments by the 
bargaining power of the supplier. 
Bargaining power of suppliers is similar throughout all segments of military 
AMRO industry.9   
• All – The military AMRO industry’s touch labor forces are unionized; 
these unions are currently experiencing labor shortages and thus the 
industry as a whole experiences these shortages (Doan, 2008).  As labor 
shortages continue, compensation contracts between AMROs and the 
                                                 
9 The following analysis applies to the segments listed in bold prior to the explanations. 
 41
unions require increased benefit packages, thereby cutting into potential 
profits and raising the bargaining power of the unions (Stewart, 2005). 
• All – Due to the specialization required for most military AMRO 
components, engines and airframe supplies, suppliers are unable to rapidly 
shift production away from military-related equipment, lowering the 
power of the suppliers (McGladrey Capital Markets LLC, 2009).  
• Component – Manufacturers are entering the AMRO component industry 
in effort to supply components for sunsetting airframes (Stewart, 2005).  
Supplying components is necessary due to the reluctance of sunsetting 
airframe OEMs to continue supplying these parts. The military requires 
these components to keep the accompanying airframes available for 
tasking; therefore, increasing the bargaining power of component 
suppliers. 
• All – As stated in U.S.C. Title 10 Sections 2466 and 2474, the availability 
of quality military AMRO is critical to the military’s ability to maintain 
core competencies required for national defense.  AMRO firms hold a 
product that is critical to the consumer’s business, thereby increasing the 
bargaining power of the supplier. 
• All – While U.S.C. Title 10 revisions have increased the amount of 
participation of private firms in the military AMRO industry, the military 
will retain the core competency to maintain and repair its aircraft.  This 
prevents excessive forward integration by the suppliers into the military 
AMRO market, thereby limiting the bargaining power of the suppliers. 
Labor concerns throughout the AMRO industry are increasing the bargaining 
power of unions, causing the AMRO industry to take proactive steps to mitigate these 
concerns.  “Airframe and power plant schools are graduating fewer students from their 
programs, but they have modernized their facilities and are prepared to address the 
impending shortage of qualified technicians.  MRO enterprises and OEMs are teaming up 
with work-study programs at aviation schools and junior colleges to meet their future 
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labor needs” (Frost & Sullivan Research, 2008).  The bargaining power of suppliers to 
the military AMRO industry is decreased due to the restrictions placed on the industry by 
U.S.C. Title 10. 
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V. PEST ANALYSIS 
A PEST analysis examines the macro-environment within which the firm operates 
by dividing the environment up into four forces:  1) Political, 2) Economic, 3) Social, and 
4) Technological.  The analysis focuses on those forces that a firm cannot control or 
greatly influence.  These macro-environmental forces interact with one another, as shown 
in the following figure: 
 
Figure 5.   PEST Analysis (After: Provenmodels, 2009) 
It is necessary for the firm to adapt its strategy to these environmental constraints 
in order to ensure continued viability.  A firm developing its strategic plan will utilize the 
results of a PEST analysis in concert with the Porter’s Five-Forces analysis to determine 
where opportunities and threats exist in the marketplace.  A PEST analysis of the AMRO 
industry will reveal those macro-economic factors within which FRCSW must operate.  
The following Sections present those factors and a brief explanation of their impact on 





Political factors refer to those government policies, laws or regulations that 
directly impact the market. 
• Federal Government decisions on the employment of the national military 
aviation enterprise.  Political decisions determine when and how the 
military, as a whole, will be employed and this employment has a direct 
impact on the MRO industry.  In FRCSW’s case the increase or decrease 
of employment of Naval Aviation around the world will directly impact 
the amount of repair hours required, and thereby influence the amount of 
work conducted at FRCSW.  The current employment of aviation assets in 
Overseas Contingency Operations increases the amount of repair work to 
be completed on all aircraft in the U.S. inventory.  In addition to general 
AMRO required by increased flight hours these operations also provide 
for $2.5 billion in additional work to conduct the necessary reset and 
reconstitution efforts prior to the aircraft’s return to the normal service 
(Michaels, 2008). 
• Job security in the local economy.  FRCSW employs nearly 3,000 Navy 
civilians, 1,000 military, and 460 civilian contractors who generated over 
$537 million in revenue during 2007, half of which went to salaries for 
these employees (Kelly, 2008). Politicians representing districts 
containing large military installations, such as FRCSW, appreciate the 
economic impact of these installations.  The continued security and 
viability of these bases directly impacts their constituents and thereby the 
politician’s ability to be re-elected.  Realignment or closure of a large 
facility creates an overriding concern for the officials and leads these 
politicians to join caucuses such as the House Military Depot and 
Industrial Facilities Caucus (Office of Congressman Walter B. Jones, 
2009).  “While the loss of jobs for DoD civilians and other adverse effects 
are in the short term inescapable byproducts of base closures, such effects  
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can continue for some time (Holman, 2001).”  Political pressure is placed 
on these military depots to ensure they remain a critical piece of national 
security and thereby maintain viability. 
• Marketing Capabilities to political leaders.  After five iterations of the 
BRAC process, designed to reshape the military enterprise, COs of 
military installations are aware of the potential of future iterations of 
BRAC impacting their commands.  In effort to ensure their command is 
not included on these potential future iterations of BRAC, they must 
develop and aggressively implement a marketing plan to sell their 
capabilities and military value to political leaders.  Development of this 
plan should focus on those attributes important to previous BRAC 
committees such as: 
a) “Current and future mission capabilities and impact on operational 
readiness of the total force of the Department of Defense, including the 
impact on joint warfighting, training, and readiness (Wynne, 2005).” 
b) “The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated 
airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, 
or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and terrain areas for the use 
of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions) at both existing and 
potential receiving locations (Wynne, 2005).” 
c) “The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and 
future total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving 
locations to support operations and training (Wynne, 2005).” 





Consideration of such BRAC attributes should steer any future strategic plans by 
FRCSW. 
• Political relationships with Foreign Military Sales (FMS) nations.  FMS 
inventory is usually sold to foreign nations with a service contract 
accompanying the sale to ensure the proper servicing of these items.  
“Foreign military sales in fiscal year 2008 climbed to more than $36 
billion (Inside Defense, 2009).”  Each of these items requires significant 
maintenance and large portions of the $36 billion quoted above will go to 
these maintenance efforts (Inside Defense, 2009).  U.S. DoD depots 
conduct much of this maintenance and loss of these contracts due to 
political processes could impact U.S. DoD depots. 
• HASC and SASC pressure to increase privatization of AMRO in effort to 
approach a 50/50 split of maintenance.  In U.S.C. Title 10 Section 2466 
Congress called for increased privatization of U.S. military depot 
capability by instituting the 50 percent law.  While the military industrial 
base has been slow to engage private industry the greatest progress has 
been seen in the engine market where 25 percent of U.S. military off-
aircraft engine maintenance is outsourced (Stewart, 2005).  While the 
majority of this outsourced maintenance is performed by OEMs and not 
independent engine repair facilities, increased outsourcing is moving the 
AMRO industry closer to the 50 percent split desired by Congress 
(Stewart, 2005).   
• Operations in an environmentally-sensitive location.  According to 
Environmental Health Perspectives, a journal produced by the National 
Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, California has some of the 
nation’s strictest environmental laws (Fisher, 1996).  Firms operating in 
California have to operate within these laws which are often more 
stringent than similar federal regulations.  FRCSW has received numerous  
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environmental awareness awards, including the White House “Closing the 
Circle Award” for environmental accomplishments, by meeting and 
exceeding federal and state environmental regulations (Paulson, 2007).   
Military AMRO depots operate in a macro-environment heavily influenced by 
political factors from local, state and federal government organizations.  The above 
political influences are a sampling of the variety of macro-environmental political factors 
that firms competing in the military AMRO industry must take into consideration.   
B. ECONOMIC 
Economic factors refer to the economic structure of a society and its influence on 
the military AMRO industry. 
• Impact of recent economic trends on the industry.  The global credit crisis 
of 2008 and 2009 caused federal officials to inject large amounts of capital 
into the banking system.  The injection of funds into the banking system 
has led elected federal officials to search for other federal programs to cut 
in effort to compensate for this expenditure.  Congressman Barney Frank 
of Massachusetts, in The Nation, stated his belief that a cut of 25 percent 
in current defense spending could help compensate for the recent federal 
expenditures made to minimize these economic downturns (Frank, 2009).  
The impact of drastic reductions in the defense budget would have a direct 
impact throughout the military including participants in the military 
AMRO market. 
• Pressure to increase use of public/private partnerships.  DoD has 
experienced increasing pressure from Congress and the Executive Branch 
to supplement maintenance capital expenditures through the use of 
public/private partnerships (Leos, Rouleau, & Wadsworth, 2007).  While 
these partnerships are expected to produce results that decrease DoD 




partners, the quantity of programs is lacking (Solis, 2008).  Only two 
percent of the total U.S. military AMRO budget is involved in these 
public/private partnerships (Stewart, 2005).   
Economic factors that were not a concern before the institution of the Navy 
Working Capital fund and the increased competition dictated by U.S.C. Title 10, are now 
a factor that must be accounted for by FRCSW.  As competition continues to increase, 
FRCSW will need to include these economic factors in future strategic plans.  
C. SOCIAL 
Social factors refer to the demographics and cultural influences that customers, 
partners and the workforce experience in the macro-environment. 
• Difficulties in obtaining qualified workforce.  Both commercial and 
military AMROs compete for the same executive, engineering support and 
technical workforce.  “International experience, improved technical 
competence for new equipment, and business acumen to handle 
consolidation, and outsourcing, are key executive competencies required 
for MRO companies in the future” (Edmonds, 2008).  FRCSW will 
continue to compete with both military depots and commercial AMRO 
providers for qualified and experienced labor. 
• Workforce Demographic concerns.  Over a quarter of the aerospace 
workforce is currently of retirement age with an average production 
worker’s age of 53 and average engineer’s age of 54 (U.S. Department of 
Labor [Employment & Training Administration], 2005). Education of 
young, qualified AMRO technicians has become a political concern; 
California State Senator Gloria Romero has proposed pre-apprenticeship 
programs for high school upperclassmen to begin training aerospace 
technicians to fill vacancies left by retiring baby-boomers (Romero, 2009). 
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• High cost of living and operating in San Diego Area.  Yearly cost of living 
estimates prepared by the Council for Community and Economic Research 
reveal that San Diego had a cost of living index of 143.8 in 2008, while 
the national average was 100 (City-Data, 2008).  This compared to the Air 
Force’s Western depot in Ogden, UT where the cost of living index was 
83.4 in 2008 (City-Data, 2008).  Average wages in 2007 for San Diego 
County were $61,793 while in Weber County, where Ogden is located, 
average wages were $52,154 (City-Data, 2008).  Disparity between costs 
of living in the two regions could influence qualified workers to migrate to 
areas with lower costs of living. 
Changing demographics and the high cost of living in San Diego County are 
social factors that could greatly affect the future workforce at FRCSW.  Future strategic 
plans should account for these social factors. 
D. TECHNOLOGICAL 
Technological factors examine the potential impact of new technologies or new 
applications of old technologies on the industry. 
• Increasing use of software integration.  Successful commercial and private 
military AMROs have adopted supply-chain management and enterprise 
management software in effort to cut costs and improve efficiency 
(Aircraft Commerce, 2007).  Enterprise management programs offer firms 
the ability to integrate maintenance activities and back office functions 
such as accounting and human resource management to optimize 
flexibility and resource allocation (SAP, 2007).  Supply-chain 
management software improves visibility throughout the supply process 
and aligns the value chain by the use of parts triggering procurement of 
replacement supplies (Cambashi, 2008).  Advances in management 
software technology will continue to provide opportunities for firms to 
differentiate themselves in the industry.  
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Previous chapters have discussed in-depth the impact of emerging technologies on 
the industry and FRCSW.  The U.S. military aviation enterprise is a technology driver 
and thus, the military AMROs must maintain the expertise and flexibility to 
accommodate technological advancements. 
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VI. KEY SUCCESS FACTORS 
An examination of the industry structure provides a forum within which the 
factors that determine the success of a firm in an industry can be analyzed.  These key 
success factors are those that directly impact the ability of a firm to be successful in its 
specific industry.  Identifying the key success factors is critical to understanding what 
makes a firm viable in the long-term.  Firms have four sources of key success factors 
(KSF); they are:  1) the industry, 2) competitive position, 3) environmental factors, and 4) 
temporal factors (Morrison, 2009).  Industry KSFs are those factors that are common to 
all participants in the industry and typically include factors that are industry-specific.  
Competitive Position KSFs are those factors that an individual firm will implement to 
distinguish itself from its competitors in the industry.  Environmental KSFs are those 
factors that exist in the macro business environment that a firm must consider to be 
successful.  Temporal factors are those factors that are important due to the occurrence of 
one-time events; while temporal factors are critical to continual internal analysis, they are 
not addressed in this paper. 
The AMRO industry, due to the conglomeration of public and private firms 
competing in the same industry, contains KSFs that are specific to only private firms or 
government depots.  The analysis conducted on the industry takes into account this 
relationship and stresses the importance of these two entities working together in the 
industry.   
The following paragraphs outline each KSF, categorize the source of the KSF in 
boldface, and provide justification for its selection. 
1) Industry – Attract and maintain a technically-proficient workforce.  Skill 
level and expertise requirements drive the search for talent in the industry.  
Both commercial and military MROs are searching for this talent, as 
illustrated in this quote by Glenn Brown, Group General Manager for 
Associated Businesses at Qantas Engineering, Technical Operations, and 
Maintenance Services: “the capability and availability of key MRO talent, from 
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the technician and mechanics on the shop floor, up to the executive suite, are our 
most consistent risk and success factors” (Edmonds, 2008).  Teams of 10 to 15 
technically-proficient workers are required to conduct field maintenance on a 
single military aircraft (Stewart, 2005).  These requirements impose hundreds 
of thousands of dollars in training costs to develop the required skills to 
perform the maintenance. 
2) Industry – Engineering expertise to provide engineering support and develop 
improved repair process and procedures.  The complexity and detailed nature 
of AMRO requires successful depots to provide organic engineering support.  
“For those problems that arise, that are unique, FRCSW works with a large 
staff of engineers to solve nearly any problem” (Kelly, 2008).  As new 
airframes and modifications are developed, engineering input is critical in 
designing new and inventive maintenance processes.  “The engineers and 
artisans at FRCSW went to work developing a technique to do what was 
undoable: remove and replace the center barrel section of the aircraft (Kelly, 
2008).”   
3) Competitive Position – Ability to conduct strategic planning for future 
product lines.  The U.S. DoD operates over 150 different airframe or airframe 
variants, each requiring specialized maintenance (Aviation Week & Space 
Technology, 2009).  There are over 60 airframes in various stages of 
development that potentially could become production airframes, and this 
does not include possible new variants of existing airframes (Global Security, 
2009).  Strategic planning to anticipate which airframes will be accepted, and 
becoming a provider for that airframe, positions a firm for continued viability 
within the industry (Michaels, 2008). 
4) Environment – Develop and sustain an aggressive marketing plan.  While 
the customer base for military AMRO is concentrated, the competition for this 
work is not (Edmonds, 2008).  For a firm to remain viable in the industry, they 
need to market their capabilities aggressively to all potential customers, 
partners and stakeholders.  It is critical for military AMRO depots to 
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vigorously seek out and establish partners.  Partners can provide the depots 
with core competencies they do not have, or offer their partner a way to 
leverage the depot’s core competency to the benefit of both firms.  
Stakeholders, including state and federal elected officials, the local population 
and labor unions, while not necessarily directly involved in the military 
AMRO market, can be greatly affected by or can greatly influence the actions 
of large military depots.  Development and implementation of a marketing 
plan that addresses both the concerns of potential partners and sells the value 
of the depot to the stakeholders is critical in ensuring continued viability. 
5) Industry – Leverage the firm’s capital to establish and maintain core 
competencies required to support military aviation enterprises.  AMRO firms 
are required to invest in both human capital and fixed assets to enter the 
market.  This investment requires that a total asset management approach is 
taken to ensure that the proper equipment and manpower is purchased to 
optimize the investment in working capital.  “The ability to access and 
accurately understand the configuration and location of these assets, 
inventories and tools enables organizations to operate, support and service 
these resources on a more cost-effective basis” (Siemens PLM, 2008).  
Utilizing a total asset management approach assists firms in focusing their 
efforts on core competencies required by the military aviation enterprise 
(Siemens PLM, 2008). 
6) Competitive Position Transitioning to Industry – Implementation and 
continual improvement of lean, six sigma and theory of constraint practices.  
“Those that do operate such programs [referring to lean and six-sigma] have 
seen average benefits (in cost reduction, turn-time improvement, and so on) in 
the range of 25 to 35 percent. Over the next few years, MRO companies that 
fail to make these investments will likely be unable to compete with their 
more efficient peers (Whyman, 2007).”  Navy FRCs have implemented a 
process referred to as AIRSpeed that combines these practices in effort to 
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instill a culture of continuous improvement that help ensure their 
competitiveness in future markets (Kelly, 2008). 
7) All – Establish and maintain effective public/private partnerships.  
Partnerships create an opportunity for DoD organic depots to engage with 
private firms in extensive business relationships beneficial to the depots, the 
private firms and the warfighters.  “By combining government capability, 
assets, and resources with corresponding contributions from the private sector, 
these arrangements leverage organic resources [DoD depots], increase the 
value of existing inventory, and generate sources of revenue” (Assistant 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Maintenance Policy, Programs and 
Resources, 2005). 
While this list of KSFs is by no means exhaustive, it presents examples of factors 
industry leaders consider in the development and implementation of their corporate 
strategy.  Consideration of firm-specific KSFs is critical in developing an individual 
firm’s strategic plan that takes into account that firms core competencies and market 
position (Morrison, 2009). 
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VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 A. CONCLUSIONS 
As FRCSW develops, their long-term strategic plan, they should remain cognizant 
of the industry and macro-environmental forces acting upon them.  Recognition of these 
forces and their impact on the industry will enable FRCSW to react to the changing 
environment and become proactive in the AMRO industry.  As the industry continues to 
expand into the private sector, continuous analysis of the external environment will be 
necessary to ensure FRCSW’s strategic plan remains viable.  FRCSW’s ability to remain 
an industry leader will become more dependent upon their ability to assess the industries 
environmental changes and adapt their core competencies to for the emerging needs of 
the U.S. Naval Aviation Enterprise. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Development of an industry analysis provides a firm with a consolidated picture 
of the market environment within which they operate.  Understanding this environment 
and leveraging the opportunities presented in the analysis will allow a firm to increase its 
competitive position within the market.  The focus of the industrial analysis is the 
eventual development of key success factors which allow a firm to concentrate their 
resources on obtaining those factors through use of their core competencies.  The 
following recommendations utilize Key Success Factors provided in Chapter VI to help 
FRCSW identify their core competencies and determine a method to further leverage 
these core competencies to increase future work.   
1. Incorporate an external industrial analysis into the current strategic 
planning process.  Inclusion of an external industrial analysis will allow 
FRCSW to further understand the marketplace within which they compete.  
Subscription to annual industry studies and market research conducted by 
firms like Frost & Sullivan, AeroStrategy and OAG Aviation Solutions 
will help in developing FRCSW’s long term strategic plan.  These 
research studies provide market data, forecasts, and trends to allow 
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FRCSW to assess its market position and possible future opportunities.  
Review of this data should become standard during strategic planning 
sessions. 
2. Market FRCSW as the industry leader in corrosion repair.  Through our 
research and discussions with staff at FRCSW the movement of DoD to a 
“purple” depot system for AMRO seems inevitable.  As this conversion 
takes place it will be critical for individual depots, such as FRCSW, to 
market their unique capabilities to lawmakers and DoD leadership 
differentiating themselves from one another and communicating the value 
of their capabilities.  At FRCSW, in our opinion, one of the core 
competencies that differentiates them from their Army, Air Force, and 
civilian competitors is their ability to conduct invasive corrosion repairs 
through innovative and technically advanced methodologies.  The 
experience gained by FRCSW in the repair of aircraft exposed to salt 
water and extreme corrosive environments should be marketed as the core 
competency that differentiates FRCSW from other DoD depots.  
Successful marketing of this capability could enable FRCSW to become a 
DoD CITE for airframe heavy repair for all airframes experiencing 
extensive corrosion. 
3. Engage other AMRO depots in information sharing of process 
improvement techniques.  Take the lead by inviting Air Force and Army 
Depot commanders and AIRSpeed equivalent officers to tour FRCSW and 
conduct joint lessons learned and best practices information exchanges.  
Following the visit of other depot commanders arrange for FRCSW 
command team to conduct a reciprocal visit at these entities.  Conduct 
short-term personnel exchanges with both technicians and back/front 
office personnel to encourage information sharing. A starting point for 
developing these relationships could be sharing the results of this thesis 
with Army and Air Force depots. 
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4. Conduct reciprocal site visits with commercial AMRO depots.  Visits with 
commercial entities such as United Services in San Francisco and Delta 
Tech Ops in Atlanta could provide similar benefits of visits with DoD 
depots and should also be arranged.  These site visits should include line 
supervisors and Product Managers to allow for idea sharing at the 
deckplate level.  Including members of the business office would allow 
further exploration and sharing of marketing ideas and potential 
public/private partnerships.  Commercial industries have years of 
experience at engaging in free market competition, a new concern for 
military depots.  Sharing of lessons learned and management techniques 
from these depots will provide additional insight into private business 
practices. 
5. Proactive development of technical aerospace workforce.  Partner with 
local high schools to inform upperclassmen of the employment 
opportunities that exist in the AMRO industry and at FRCSW in 
particular.  These partnerships could include visits by FRCSW employees 
to the high schools allowing students to gain first-hand knowledge of the 
opportunities that exist in the aerospace industry. Contact California State 
Senator Gloria Romero, who is currently proposing legislation to recruit 
and train high school students for employment in the aerospace industry, 
for state assistance in these efforts. 
6. Proactive development of professional engineering and management 
workforce.  Develop and institute internship opportunities for engineering 
students at local universities to increase interest in aerospace engineering 
for AMRO.  Similar opportunities should also be developed to attract 
MBA students with backgrounds in financial management, supply chain 
management and logistics engineering.  These internships could present 
opportunities for successful interns to return to FRCSW in a permanent 
position. 
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7. Explore opportunities to enter the UAV MRO market.  Congressional 
Budget Office studies have proposed the option of replacing large portions 
of the current manned fighter aircraft fleet with both land and carrier based 
UAVs (Eveker & Arthur, 2009).  Congressional decisions to increase the 
UAV force and reduce manned aircraft may have a significant impact on 
FRCSW unless they are able to obtain maintenance capabilities and 
develop the necessary skills to provide MRO services for UAVs. 
8. Explore opportunities to capture outsourced military depot level 
maintenance.  Currently the Army outsources all of its fixed wing depot 
level maintenance to either the Air Force or private firms.  While the fleet 
of fixed wing aircraft in the Army is small, core competencies in aircraft 
such as the E-2/C-2 provide FRCSW with the background in narrow body 
transport type aircraft necessary to compete for these contracts.  Close 
examination of other services outsourced work may provide additional 
opportunities for FRCSW to leverage their core competencies and bring in 
more work.  
9. Explore opportunities to develop public/private partnerships that utilize 
the engineering expertise of FRCSW.  Engineers at military depots are 
intimately familiar with the equipment and systems they work with.  
Partnering with OEMs and private firms by contributing engineering 
expertise to the partnership would expand the public/private partnership 
opportunities offered by FRCSW.  The engineering requirements for small 
firms can constitute a large portion of the production costs.  Military 
depots contracting out these consultant-type services would expand the 
capabilities of their private partners. 
10. Analyze production lines to determine excess capacity and market that 
capacity.  Encourage product managers to determine excess capacity in 
each product line and provide that information to the business office.  The 
business office can then utilize this information to market available 
capacity to private firms and military entities outsourcing maintenance 
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work.  The production line analysis should include costs for expanding 
shifts and analysis of the effective capacity of each link in the value chain 
of that product line.  Marketing should focus on process capabilities vice 
current production line implementation. 
C. AREAS FOR FUTURE STUDY 
As a result of this project opportunities exist for future study; the following list 
proposes specific topic areas of interest: 
• Develop a plan to coordinate with State Senator Gloria Romero on her 
initiatives to engage San Diego area high school students in the aerospace 
industry to ensure FRCSW gains increased exposure to these potential 
employees. 
• Consolidate a list of best practices and lessons learned at all military 
AMRO depots. 
• Conduct a market study on the UAV MRO market with a focus on 
potential opportunities for FRCSW. 
• Examine opportunities for DoD to unify AMRO across service lines and 
develop a truly “purple” approach to aviation depot level repairs.  One 
methodology that could be used is examination of core competencies at 
each depot in DoD and developing a system that leverages these core 
competencies to the greatest benefit of the DoD.  An example of this 
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